by vele
Reuven Amitai-Preiss Reuven Amitai-Preiss

In this study, the origins and early course of the Mamluk-Ilkhanid war have been examined through narrative history interspersed with chapters of a monographic nature. Ebben a vizsg�latban, a sz�rmaz�s �s a korai sor�n a Mamluk-Ilkhanid h�bor� vizsg�ltak �t narrat�v t�rt�nelem interspersed a fejezetek egy monogr�fi�ra jelleg�. Having looked at the war in some detail, it is appropriate to conclude this study with an overview of the subject, keeping in mind two paramount questions: why did this war continue, and why were the Mamluks successful in stopping the Mongols? Miut�n megn�zte a h�bor� n�h�ny r�szlet, hely�nval�, hogy megk�tik ezt a tanulm�ny �ttekinti a t�m�val kapcsolatban, szem el�tt tartva, k�t kiemelked� k�rd�st: mi�rt ez a h�bor� folytat�dik, �s mi�rt voltak az Mamluks sikeres meg�ll�s a mongolok?

In recent studies, Professor JM Smith, Jr . A legut�bbi tanulm�nyok professzora JM Smith, Jr. and Dr. DO Morgan have offered fresh insights into the nature of the Mamluk-Mongol war. Dr. DO Morgan felaj�nlott�k friss betekint�st a term�szet a Mamluk-mongol h�bor�. Professor Smith, in a wide-ranging article, analyzes the weaponry and tactics of both sides, and embarks on a technical discussion on the strengths and limitations of the Mongol and Mamluk horses. Smith professzor, a sz�les k�r� cikkben elemzi a fegyverek �s a taktika mindk�t oldalon, �s belefog egy technikai jelleg� vita az er�ss�gei �s korl�tai a mongol �s Mamluk lovakat. In the first section of this chapter, his approach will be considered and elaborated upon. Az els� szakaszban az e fejezet, a megk�zel�t�st fogj�k tekinteni, �s kidolgozta az. In the second section, the question of the logistical problems encountered by the Mongols in Syria, as raised independently by Professor Smith and Dr. Morgan, will be examined. A m�sodik szakaszban az a k�rd�s, hogy a logisztikai probl�m�k a mongolok Sz�ri�ban, a felvetett f�ggetlen�l Smith professzor �s Dr. Morgan fogj�k vizsg�lni. In the final section, I will suggest explanations for both the ongoing war and the Mamluk success in stopping the Mongols. Az utols� szakasz, azt javasolja magyar�zatokat egyar�nt zajl� h�bor�, �s a siker Mamluk meg�ll�s a mongolok.

Csapatok �s a taktika k�pest

Professor Smith's discussion, the most detailed and systematic study of the subject yet attempted, can be summarized as follows: the Mongol army was a people's army, that is, all Mongol adult males were enlisted. Smith professzor a vita, a r�szletes �s rendszeres vizsg�lata t�rgy�t m�g k�s�rletet tettek, a k�vetkez�k�ppen foglalhat� �ssze: a mongol hadsereg a n�pek hadsereg, azaz minden mongol kifejlett h�mekn�l is besorozott. Since these soldiers, however, were not professionals, they had undergone a somewhat haphazard training. Mivel ezek a katon�k, azonban nem szakemberek, hogy �tesett egy kicsit rendszertelen�l k�pz�s. The majority of Mongol troops were armed with mediocre, homemade weapons, and most carried only bows and arrows, along with axes and clubs. A legt�bb mongol csapatok felfegyverkezve k�z�pszer�, h�zi fegyverek, �s a legt�bb sor csak �j �s nyilak, valamint a tengely �s a klub. Because of this lack of weapons appropriate for hand-to-hand combat and their inferior training, the Mongols were hesitant to engage in frontal attacks, preferring instead to depend on their archery and mobility. Ennek hi�nya a fegyverek megfelel� k�zitusa lek�zd�s�re �s gyeng�bb a k�pz�s, a mongolok voltak t�tova, hogy kezdj�k meg a front�lis t�mad�st, jobban ink�bb f�gg az �j�szat �s a mobilit�st. In order to maintain this mobility, each Mongol troop would lead a string of mounts, small steppe horses, when they set out on campaign. Annak �rdek�ben, hogy fenntartsuk ezt a mobilit�st, az egyes mongol csapat vezet egy csom� csatol�sokat, kis steppe l�, amikor meg a kamp�nyt. While on march, they could thus change mounts when necessary. B�r a m�rcius, akkor �gy v�ltoz�sok r�gz�t�s�t, ha sz�ks�ges. During the battle itself, the Mongols would remount at frequent intervals, and thus so maintain their famed mobility. A csat�ban maga a mongolok is remonda id�k�z�nk�nt, �s �gy �gy fenntartani, hogy h�res mobilit�st. The small steppe horse, really a pony, would quickly tire, thus necessitating rapid changes of mounts. A kis steppe l�, t�nyleg egy p�nit, majd gyorsan f�rad, �gy sz�ks�gess� v�lik a gyors v�ltoz�sok r�gz�t�s�t. The tactics of the Mongols reflected their dependence on archery and mobility: A taktika a mongolok t�kr�zt�k a f�gg�s�g �j�szat �s mobilit�s:

The Mongols ... A mongolok ... sent unit after unit galloping at the enemy as fast as could be with each man shooting one heavy arrow from as close as possible; each unit would then turn away and out of the path and line of fire of the next unit, which could follow almost on its heels. k�ld�tt egys�g ut�n az egys�g galoppoz� ellens�g, amilyen gyorsan csak lehet minden ember egy forgat�s neh�z arrow a lehet� legk�zelebb, minden egys�g akkor fordulj el �s ki az �tvonalat �s a sorban a t�z a k�vetkez� egys�g, amely majdnem k�vet�se a sark�ra. Thus the enemy would be repeatedly pounded by the Mongols' best shots, delivered by a quick and confusing succession of attacking units, each concealing the next until the last moment. �gy az ellens�g lenne ism�telten d�b�rg�tt a mongolok legjobb l�v�sek leadott egy gyors �s zavaros egym�st t�mad� egys�gek, minden egyes rejt a k�vetkez�, am�g az utols� pillanatban. Each unit would charge, shoot, turn and gallop away, and then circle into position for another charge, in this way making several attacks... Minden egys�g lenne d�j, lõj, kapcsolja, �s v�gta el, majd k�rbe a hely�re egy m�sik d�j, �gy a t�bb t�mad�st ... The attacking units would then give place to fresh forces and retire to rest, rearm, and remount. A t�mad� egys�gek is helyet ad majd, a friss er�k �s vonulnak a pihen�sre, hogy �jra felfegyverez �s p�tl�. [Previously, Smith wrote that a Mongol horse-archer could not fire more than one effective shot, as he charged his opponent; this arrow was let loose at a distance of about 30 meters.] [Kor�bban Smith azt �rta, hogy a mongol lovas �j�sz sem t�zet t�bb mint egy hat�sos l�v�s, mert az ellenf�l terheli, ez volt arrow kienged a t�vols�g k�r�lbel�l 30 m�ter.]

The aim of such tactics, together with efforts at outflanking, was to wear down the enemy. A c�l az ilyen taktik�t egy�tt er�fesz�t�seket �tkarol� volt lekoptat az ellens�get. If the Mongols faced cavalry, it was hoped that they could provoke a pursuit, with the Mongols shooting to the rear (the so-called Parthian shot) as they rode off. Ha a mongolok lovass�ggal szemben, azt rem�lte, hogy nem egy olyan t�rekv�s, amely a mongolok forgat�s, hogy a h�ts� (az �gynevezett parthus l�v�s), mivel azok ellovagolt. This would lead to the exhaustion of the opponents' horses. Ez a kimer�lts�g az ellenfelek lovakat. At some point, the Mongols, either on fresh horses or reinforced by additional troops, would turn against their pursuers, dealing them a crushing blow or harassing them as they withdrew. Valamikor, a mongolok, vagy a friss lovakat �s meger�s�tett kieg�sz�t� csapatok, amit�l ellen �ld�zõk foglalkoz� �ket �ri�si csap�s vagy zaklatja �ket, mivel visszavonta. In general, the Mongols tried to avoid handto-hand combat, because of their lack of personal arms and armor. �ltal�noss�gban elmondhat�, hogy a mongolok pr�b�lta elker�lni handto oldali harc, mert hi�nyzik a szem�lyes fegyver �s p�nc�l.

The Mamluk army was also based on mounted archers, but the equipment of its troops and its tactics were different. A Mamluk hadsereg is alapul szerelt �j�szok, hanem a berendez�st a csapatok �s a taktika volt k�l�nb�z�. The Mamluk trooper was heavily armed with bow and arrow, sword, dagger, axe or mace, lance, shield and body armor. A kapit�ny volt Mamluk er�sen felfegyverkezve �j �s ny�l, kard, t�r, balta �s buzog�ny, l�ndzsa, pajzs, p�nc�l �s a test. His horse, a large Arabian steed, was fed primarily on fodder. A l�, a nagy arab paripa volt, els�sorban az etetett takarm�ny. However, due to the expense of maintaining a horse in a sedentary society, most Mamluks only had one mount. Mivel azonban a saj�t k�lts�g�re, hogy fenntartja a l� a mozg�sszeg�ny t�rsadalom t�bbs�ge Mamluks csak egy mount. The Mamluks were picked troops and thus on the whole were better raw material for soldiers than their Mongol counterparts, who were just average men. A Mamluks volt v�logatott csapatok, �s �gy az eg�sz jobb nyersanyagot a katon�k, mint a mongol t�rsaik, akik csak az �tlagos emberek. In addition, the Mamluks underwent thorough, long-term training. Ezen k�v�l a Mamluks al� alapos, hossz� t�v� k�pz�s. Of particular importance in their training was shooting while galloping, which was regularly practiced in the hippodromes. K�l�n�sen fontos a k�pz�s forgat�s k�zben galoppoz�, amit rendszeresen gyakorolj�k a hippodromes.

The battlefield tactics of the Mamluks also differed from those of the Mongols. A harct�ri taktika a Mamluks is elt�r az mongolok. As they had only one mount, they could not compete with the mobility of the Mongols, each of whom had several horses at his disposal. Mivel m�r csak egy mount, nem tudnak versenyezni a mobilit�s a mongolok, akik mindegyike t�bb lovat, hogy �lljon. Rather, they exploited their better-quality bows and arrows and their rigorous training. Ink�bb csak kihaszn�lj�k a jobb min�s�g� �j �s nyilak, valamint a szigor� k�pz�sben. Mounted on standing horses, the Mamluks would let off a succession of deadly shots when the Mongols attacked. Csatlakoztatott �ll� l�, a Mamluks azt hagyd ki egym�st a hal�los l�v�s, amikor a mongolok megt�madt�k. "Unless the Mongols could use their greater mobility to outflank and surround the Mamluks, or superior numbers to wear them down, Mamluk archery would balance and overbalance the Mongols' horsepower." "Kiv�ve, ha a mongolok is haszn�lj�k a nagyobb mobilit�s �s �tkarol k�r�l Mamluks, vagy kiv�l� sz�mokat viselni �ket, Mamluk �j�szat lenne egyens�ly �s t�bblets�ly a mongolok" l�er�. Although Professor Smith does not explicitly say so, it would seem, according to this suggestion, that the Mamluks having repelled a Mongol assault, would then attack, bringing into play their heavier shock power. B�r Smith professzor kifejezetten nem mondja, �gy t�nik, hogy ezt a javaslatot, hogy a Mamluks miut�n vissza a mongol t�mad�s, akkor t�mad�s, amely szerint a nagyobb �t�s erej�t.

There is much that is convincing in this model, the first systematic attempt to compare the fighting abilities and tactics of the Mamluks and Mongols. Sok, ami meggy�z� ebben a modellben, az els� szisztematikus k�s�rlet �sszehasonl�tani a harci k�pess�gek �s a taktika az Mamluks �s a mongolok. I would suggest, however, that it must be modified to some degree by additional evidence from sources of various provenance. �n azonban azt sugallja, hogy meg kell m�dos�tani, hogy bizonyos m�rt�kig tov�bbi bizony�t�kok forr�sai k�l�nf�le rendelkezik. First, the Mongols may have been better equipped than has been suggested. El�sz�r is, a mongolok m�r jobban, mint azt kor�bban javasolta. While John of Plano Carpini and William of Rubruck describe poorly equipped regular troopers, having only bows, arrows and axes, their contemporary, Thomas of Spalato, writes that the Mongols carried helmets, swords and bows. M�g J�nos Plano Carpini �s William Rubruck le�rni a rosszul felszerelt regul�ris katon�k, csak �j, a nyilak �s a tengelyek, a kort�rs, Thomas a Spalato, azt �rja, hogy a mongolok folytatott sisakok, kardok �s �j. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi reports that the Mongols used swords in their battles with the Khwarazm-shah Jalal al-Din. Sibt ibn al-Jawzi azt jelenti, hogy a mongolok haszn�lt kard a csat�t a Khwarazm-sah Jalal al-Din. Marco Polo, describing the situation later in the thirteenth century, states that the Mongols had sword and mace, and even shields. Marco Polo, amely le�rja a helyzetet k�s�bb, a tizenharmadik sz�zadban, hogy a mongolok m�r kard �s vir�g, �s m�g pajzsok. In addition, it must be remembered that the Ilkhanids and their Mongol soldiers were no longer wandering about on the Eurasian steppes, but now had possession of an extensive empire encompassing major centers of urban civilization. Ezenk�v�l eml�keztetni kell arra, hogy a Ilkhanids �s mongol katon�k m�r nem wandering about a eur�zsiai sztyepp�n, de most m�r birtok�ban kiterjedt birodalom mag�ba f� k�zpontja v�rosi civiliz�ci�. This surely must have influenced the quality and variety of the arms that the Mongol soldier now carried. Ez biztosan kell befoly�solt�k a min�s�g �s a k�l�nf�le fegyverek, hogy a mongol katona most sor. It would seem that the Ilkhans and their officials by then had enough skilled craftsmen at their disposal to produce some high-quality weapons and other accessories for the Mongols. �gy t�nik, hogy a Ilkhans �s tisztvisel�k voltak, akkor el�g k�pzett mesteremberek �ll rendelkez�s�kre, hogy valami j� min�s�g� fegyverek �s egy�b kieg�sz�t�k a mongolok. [Marco Polo praises the craftsmen of Kirman for the implements of war which they manufactured, including swords, bows, quivers and "arms of every kind."] Certainly, throughout the empire there were armorers who had made weapons for the pre-Mongol armies. [Marco Polo m�ltatja a k�zm�vesek a Kirman a h�bor�, amely v�grehajtja azokat gy�rtott, k�zt�k a kard, �j, tegezek �s fegyverek minden fajt�ja. "] Term�szetesen, az eg�sz birodalom volt armorers, aki a fegyvereket a pre-mongol seregek . This capacity would now be turned over for the use of the Mongols. Ez a kapacit�s most �t p�ld�ul a mongolok. All of this was in addition to military stores that the Mongols seized whenever they conquered a new area. Mindennek az volt, hogy a katonai rakt�rak, hogy a mongolok amikor a lefoglalt megh�d�totta egy �j ter�leten. [Smith writes that the Mongols "also developed a 'military-industrial complex' to supply weapons," but possibly only in Ghazan's time.] It might also be mentioned in passing that the skills of the Mongol nomads themselves in producing weapons and other implements of war were perhaps underestimated in the previous discussion. [Smith �rja, hogy a mongolok "is, a" katonai-ipari �sszetett ", hogy a fegyvereket, de val�sz�n�leg csak Ghazan ideje.] Azt is meg kell eml�teni, hogy az �thalad� k�szs�gek a mongol nom�dok, akik fegyverek el��ll�t�s�ra �s az egy�b v�grehajt� A h�bor� nem lehet al�becs�lni a kor�bbi vit�t. [Jagchid and Hyer wrote that "the Mongols were very adept at such work as blacksmithing and production of armor and weapons." [Jagchid �s Hyer azt �rta, hogy "a mongolok nagyon �gyes az ilyen munka-�s termel�si blacksmithing a p�nc�lt �s fegyvert." I might add that I was impressed during my own visits to nomads in Mongolia by the high quality of their metal and leatherwork, although - as far as I could tell - no weapons are being produced today.] Azt is hozz�teszik, hogy �n voltam ragadtatva a saj�t l�togat�sok nom�dok Mong�li�ban a j� min�s�g�, hogy a f�m-�s leatherwork, b�r - amennyire tudtam - nem fegyverek ker�lnek el� ma.]

The occupation of greater Iran may have had a second possible influence. A foglalkoz�s nagyobb Ir�n k�nytelen volt egy m�sik lehets�ges befoly�s�t. The Mongols could now supplement the diet of their horses with either grazing on cultivated fields or grains collected through taxes or expropriated in other ways. A mongolok most kieg�sz�tik az �trendet, hogy lovak vagy legeltet�ssel a megm�velt ter�leteken vagy szemek kereszt�l kisaj�t�tott az ad�k vagy egy�b m�dokon. This would lead to the strengthening of their horses. Ez az er�s�t�se a lovakat. While there is no explicit evidence that the Mongols adopted the larger horses found in the areas under their control, there is information that they had shown an interest in both the horses used by local nomads [In 658/1260, the Mongols seized horses from the bedouin in Trans-Jordan; in 668/1269, the Mongols raided north Syria, looting the livestock of the bedouin in the area.] and those ridden by the Armenians. Am�g nincs egy�rtelm� bizony�t�k arra, hogy a mongolok elfogadta a nagyobb lovak megtal�lhat�k a saj�t ellen�rz�se alatt �ll� ter�letekre, van inform�ci�, hogy mutattak �rdekl�d�st a lovak �ltal alkalmazott helyi nom�dok [A 658/1260, a mongolok lefoglalt lovak a Bedouin transzdiszciplin�ris Jordan, a 668/1269, a mongolok h�zkutat�st Sz�ria �szaki, fosztogat�sra az �llat�llom�ny a Bedouin ter�n.] �s az elnyomott az �rm�nyek. [The Mongols constantly seized the horses of the Armenians.] In short, the Mongols of the Ilkhanid state may well have ridden on smaller horses and been less equipped for receiving and delivering frontal assaults than their Mamluk enemies, but perhaps the difference was not as great as suggested above. [A mongolok folyamatosan lefoglalta a lovak az �rm�nyek.] R�viden, a mongolok az Ilkhanid �llapota alapj�n is elnyomott a kisebb lovak �s kev�sb� felszerelt fogad�s�ra �s nyilv�n�tott front�lis t�mad�sokat, mint a Mamluk ellens�get, de tal�n ez a k�l�nbs�g nem nagy a fent javasolt.

The Mamluk troops were not quite the supermen they have been portrayed as. A Mamluk csapatok nem voltak teljesen supermen ezeket a szolg�ltat�sokat. Certainly they were not all cut from the same cloth. Term�szetesen ezek nem minden kiv�gott ugyanolyan ruh�t. Only the royal mamluks were usually given the first-rate training of the Sultan's military schools. Csak a kir�lyi mamluks voltak �ltal�ban az els� oszt�ly� k�pz�se a szult�n katonai iskol�kban. The amirs' mamluks had an inferior military education. A amirs "mamluks volt egy kisebb katonai oktat�s. In addition, during the early years of the Mamluk period, the period under discussion here, many of the troopers in the amirs' units were not even mamluks, but rather free horsemen. Tov�bb�, a korai �vekben a Mamluk id�szakban az id�szakban a vita itt, sok a katona az amirs "egys�gek sem mamluks, hanem szabad lovasok. These could have been Kurds, refugee Muslim military personnel (including mamluks), and Mongol wafidiyya. Ezek lettek volna a kurdok, menek�lt muzulm�n katonai szem�lyzet (bele�rtve a mamluks), �s mongol wafidiyya. The halqa, then an important part of the Mamluk army, was mainly composed of these non-mamluk elements . A halqa, akkor egy fontos r�sze a Mamluk hadsereg volt, amely f�leg a nem mamluk elemek. Some of the halqa was actually quite similar to the Mongols in ethnic origin and military techniques. N�h�ny a halqa val�j�ban nagyon hasonl�t a mongolok az etnikai sz�rmaz�sra �s a katonai technik�k.

Care should even be taken with regard to the royal mamluks, those mamluks bought and raised by the Sultan . �gyelni kell m�g tenni a tekintetben, hogy a kir�lyi mamluks, ezek mamluks v�s�rolt �s felvetette a szult�n. [The royal mamluks (al-mamalik al-sultaniyya) were composed of the sultan's personal mamluks, those of former sultans, and mamluks of deceased or declasse amirs.] At the battle of 'Ayn Jalut, Qutuz had been Sultan less than a year, certainly an inadequate period in which to build a large unit of personal mamluks. [A kir�lyi mamluks (az al-mamalik al-sultaniyya) volt, melyet a szult�n szem�lyes mamluks, az egykori sultans, �s mamluks elhunyt vagy deklassz�lt amirs.] A csata "Ayn Jalut, Qutuz volna Sultan kevesebb mint egy �ve , term�szetesen a nem megfelel� id� �ll rendelkez�s�re ahhoz, hogy egy nagy egys�g a szem�lyes mamluks. In fact, the first decade of Mamluk rule (1250-60) had been characterized by instability, in-fighting and changes of rulers, hardly conducive to the orderly establishment of a strong corps of royal mamluks. S�t, az els� �vtized�ben Mamluk szab�ly (1250-60) volt jellemz� az instabilit�s, a harcok �s v�ltoz�sok az uralkod�k, aligha kedvez a rendes l�trehoz�sa er�s corps kir�lyi mamluks. At the battle of Homs in 680/1281, the majority of Qalawun's personal mamluks were young and inexperienced, while the body of veteran royal mamluks - the Zahiriyya - had been weakened by Qalawun's purges. A csata Homs a 680/1281, a legt�bb Qalawun szem�lyes mamluks volt fiatal �s tapasztalatlan, ugyanakkor a szervezet a veter�n kir�lyi mamluks - a Zahiriyya - m�r meggyeng�lt Qalawun's �bl�t�s�b�l.
There is no doubt that with time the royal mamluks received thorough training in swordsmanship, horsemanship, lancework, and archery on the ground and from a galloping horse. Nem k�ts�ges, hogy id�vel a kir�lyi mamluks kapott alapos k�pz�st kardforgat�s m�v�szete, lovagl�s m�v�szete, lancework, �j�szat, �s a f�ld�n, �s a v�gtat� l�. Having mastered horsemanship and the lance game, the young mamluks were sent to the hippodrome, where they received "cavalry training proper, ie coaching in teamwork. The mamluks did group exercises, learning how to enter, come out, turn right or left, advance or retreat together and to know, in any fight, their own place as well as that of their fellows." Miut�n elsaj�t�totta a lovagl�s m�v�szete �s lance j�t�k, a fiatal mamluks k�ldtek a l�versenyp�lya, ahol megkapta "lovas k�pz�s megfelel�, azaz a coaching a csapatmunka. A mamluks tett csoportos torna, a tanul�s, hogyan lehet bel�pni, gyere ki, jobbra vagy balra, el�re vagy a visszavonul�st, s tudom, hogy minden k�zdelem, a saj�t helye, valamint, hogy a bar�taim. " It would seem that this training was of relatively small tactical units. �gy t�nik, hogy ez a k�pz�s volt, viszonylag kis taktikai egys�gek. There was nothing to indicate that maneuvers of large-scale units in the field were undertaken, as with the Mongols during their hunts. Nem volt semmi sem jelzi, hogy manõvereket nagym�ret� egys�gek ter�n sz�letett, mint a mongolok sor�n vad�szik. [Both Baybars and Qalawun went hunting, but it would seem that these were small-scale affairs involving the sultan and his entourage.] [Mindk�t Baybars �s Qalawun ment a vad�szat, de �gy t�nik, hogy ezek a kism�ret� �gyeit �rint� szult�n �s k�s�ret�t.]

It is worth dwelling on the Mamluk horses. �rdemes lak�s a Mamluk lovakat. First, not all of their horses were of Arabian stock. El�sz�r is, nem minden az arab lovak voltak rakt�ron. A major source of Mamluk mounts was Cyrenaica (al-barqa). Egyik f� forr�sa volt Mamluk r�gz�t�st�l Cyrenaica (az al-barqa). These horses were very strong and were something between an Arabian horse and a pack-horse, with the latter's sturdy legs; they were thus well suited to rough terrain . Ezek a lovak nagyon er�s, �s valami k�z�tt arab l� �s egy m�lh�s l�, az ut�bbi massz�v l�bak ezek �gy kiv�l�an alkalmas arra, hogy durva terepre. Second, the Mongols were not alone in maintaining remounts. M�sodszor, a mongolok nem voltak egyed�l fenntartani remounts. The Mamluks also brought with them to battle reserve horses, the jana'ib (plural of janib). A Mamluks is hozta �ket a csata tartal�k lovak, a jana'ib (plural of janib). Al-'Umari states that the amirs brought with them jana'ib the number of which varied, depending on the wealth of each amir and the importance he attributed to this matter. Al-'Umari kimondja, hogy a amirs hozta �ket jana'ib a sz�mot, amelynek v�ltozatos, att�l f�gg�en, a vagyon minden em�r �s annak fontoss�g�t is tulajdon�that�, hogy ebben a k�rd�sben. It is unclear if the regular Mamluk troops, be they royal mamluks, or the mamluks of amirs and halqa troopers, had recourse to spare mounts, but it appears that their use was not as widespread as among the Mongols. Nem vil�gos, ha a rendszeres Mamluk csapatok, ak�r kir�lyi mamluks, vagy a mamluks a amirs �s halqa katona volt, hogy tartal�k r�gz�t�st�l, de �gy t�nik, hogy haszn�latuk nem volt annyira elterjedt, mint a mongolok k�z�tt.

On the basis of the above discussion, it can be suggested that the Mamluks and Mongols may have been more evenly matched than proposed by Professor Smith. Alapj�n a fenti besz�lget�s, akkor azt javasolta, hogy a mongolok Mamluks �s m�r t�bb mint egyenletesen egyez�s� �ltal javasolt Smith professzor. While experienced royal mamluks may have had few equals among the Mongols (or any other army of the time) , such troops did not form the majority of the Mamluk army, much of which was composed of less thoroughly trained amirs' mamluks, along with various non-mamluk troops, including Mongol wafidiyya. M�g a tapasztalt kir�lyi mamluks is volt n�h�ny egyenl� k�z�tt a mongolok (vagy b�rmely m�s, a hadsereg az id�), az ilyen csapatok nem alkotj�k a t�bbs�get a Mamluk hadsereg, amelynek nagy r�sze volt, amely kevesebb, alaposan kik�pzett amirs "mamluks, valamint a k�l�nb�z� nem mamluk csapatok, bele�rtve a mongol wafidiyya. On the other hand, after the consolidation of Ilkhanid rule the Mongol army was probably better equipped and perhaps better mounted than they had been when they came off the steppe. M�sr�szt, az egys�ges Ilkhanid szab�ly a mongol hadsereg val�sz�n�leg jobban felszerelt, �s tal�n jobban felszerelt, mint azok voltak, amikor j�ttem ki a steppe. Even assuming that the training of the average Mongol was less rigorous than that of his Mamluk counterpart, the Mongols enjoyed a clear advantage in the training of large-scale units. M�g ha felt�telezz�k is, hogy a k�pz�s az �tlagos mongol kev�sb� volt szigor�, mint az � Mamluk partner, a mongolok egy�rtelm� el�nyt �lveztek a k�pz�si nagym�ret� egys�g.

The Mamluks themselves do not seem to have been aware of any great advantage over their Mongol adversaries. A Mamluks is �gy t�nik, nem volt tudom�sa olyan nagy el�nnyel, a Mongol ellenfelek. The resources, time and energy which the Mamluks devoted to training and expanding their army, along with the strengthening of border fortresses and the development of the espionage system, show how seriously they considered Mongol military prowess. A p�nzt, id�t �s energi�t, amelyet a Mamluks ford�tani a k�pz�s �s azok hadsereg, valamint a hat�rellen�rz�s meger�s�t�se er�d�tm�nyek valamint a k�mked�s rendszer azt mutatj�k, hogy mennyire komolyan m�rlegelni mongol katonai vit�zs�g. The large-scale mobilizations of the Mamluk army at the slightest hint of a Mongol raid, let alone offensive, also indicate that the Mamluks did not disparage their enemy. A nagyszab�s� mobilizations a Mamluk hadsereg a legkisebb hint egy mongol RAID, nemhogy s�rt�, azt is jelzik, hogy a Mamluks nem lebecs�l saj�t ellens�ge.

A compelling piece of evidence regarding the Mamluk view of the Mongols is found in Ibn 'Abd al-Rahim's continuation of Ibn Wasil's chronicle. A k�telez� darab bizony�t�k a Mamluk tekintettel a mongolok tal�lhat� Ibn 'Abd al-Rahim az folytat�s�t Ibn Wasil a kr�nika. The writer, a Mamluk official, accompanied Baybars's expedition to Rum in 675/ 1277, and recorded the following incident: when the Mamluk army left Ram, it camped near Harim to rest. Az �r�, a Mamluk hivatalos k�s�ret�ben Baybars exped�ci�j�nak a Rum a 675 / 1277, �s r�gz�teni kell a k�vetkez� esem�nyt: ha a bal Mamluk hadsereg Ram, a t�bort Harim k�zel�ben pihenni. When 'Id al-Adha ("Sacrificial Feast") arrived, the Sultan forbad the beating of the "drums of good tidings" on the holiday. Amikor "Id al-Adha (�ldozati �nnep) �rkezett, a szult�n forbad a dobog� a" dob a j� h�r "a sz�net. When the amirs asked for an explanation. Amikor a amirs k�rt magyar�zatot. He replied: Azt felelte:

How can I rejoice? Hogyan tudok �r�lni? I had believed that if 10,000 horsemen of my army were to meet 30,000 Mongols, I would defeat them. Azt hitte, hogy ha az �n 10.000 lovas hadsereget kellett volna tal�lkozniuk 30000 mongolok, azt veres�g �ket. But I met 7000 [Mongols) with all my army. De tal�lkoztam 7000 [mongolok) a minden hadsereg. [The Mongols] aroused panic and [my] army lost heart. [A mongolok] felkeltette a p�nik �s a [My] hadsereg elvesztette a sz�v�t. [The Mongols] defeated the [Muslim] Left. [A mongolok] legy�zte a [muszlim] Bal. Without Allah's grace, they would have defeated us. An�lk�l, Allah a t�relmi id�, akkor legy�z�tt minket. If I met them, and they were equal to the [Muslims in size], or larger than they, then [the matter] would not have turned out well. Ha tal�lkoztam vel�k, �s �k is egyenl�k az [muzulm�nokkal size], vagy nagyobb, mint �k, akkor [az �gy] nem lett volna j�.

There is nothing in this story that rings false; Ibn 'Abd al-Rahim. Nincs semmi ez a t�rt�net, hogy a gy�r�k false; Ibn 'Abd al-Rahim. was in a position to record this incident. volt abban a helyzetben, hogy ezt a rekordot esem�ny. Even if it is apocryphal, it may well reflect the Mamluk perception of their strength vis-a-vis the Mongols. M�g akkor is, ha k�tes, akkor j�l t�kr�zik a Mamluk �rz�kelik erej�ket szemben a mongolok. One thing is certain: a relatively small Mongol force (although apparently more than the number given here) had given the Mamluk army, which included a large corps of experienced Zahiri royal mamluks, a tough battle before they were defeated. Egy dolog biztos: a viszonylag kis mongol er� (b�r �gy t�nik, mint a sz�m itt) adta a Mamluk hadsereg, k�zt�k egy nagy test�let tapasztalt Zahiri kir�lyi mamluks, kem�ny csata, miel�tt a veres�get. This last fact, more than anything else, should call into question the idea that on a man-to-man basis the Mamluk army was inherently vastly superior to its Mongol counterpart. Ez ut�bbi t�ny, t�bb, mint b�rmi m�st, hogy k�ts�gbe vonja azt az elk�pzel�st, hogy egy f�rfi a f�rfival alapj�n a Mamluk hadsereg eleve jelent�sen fel�lm�lja a Mongol ellent�telez�ssel.

I am in general agreement with Professor Smith's discussion of Mongol and Mamluk tactics, although this can be perhaps refined by specific information in the Mamluk sources. �n �ltal�ban egyet�rt professzor Smith vita mongol �s Mamluk taktika, b�r ez lehet ak�r finom�tott konkr�t inform�ci�t a Mamluk forr�sokb�l. I must admit, however, that a number of questions present themselves for which clear-cut answers -have yet to be found. Be kell vallanom azonban, hogy sz�mos k�rd�st fel, amelyek vil�gos v�laszt-m�g meg kell tal�lni. It is true that Marco Polo describes how the horses of the Mongols "are trained so perfectly that they will double hither and thither, just like a dog would do ." Az igaz, hogy a Marco Polo le�rja, hogy a lovak a mongolok "k�pzett �gy t�k�letes, hogy k�tszer ide-oda, mint egy kutya lenne." Yet it is difficult to imagine Mongol troops riding forth towards the Mamluks and letting loose a volley at a short distance (ca. 30 meters), then wheeling round and galloping back. M�gis neh�z elk�pzelni, mongol csapatok lovagl�korb�csok oda fel� Mamluks, b�rbead�sa laza egy volley egy r�vid t�vols�g (kb. 30 m�ter), majd kerekez�s kerek �s v�gtat� vissza. All of this while the Mamluks, perched on their horses, were letting off shot after shot. Mind e k�zben a Mamluks, perched a l�, le is hagyta l�v�s ut�n l�v�s. It is also unclear what happens next. Az is vil�gos, hogy mi t�rt�nik ezut�n. Did the Mongols then ride past the side of the next unit coming up to launch an attack? Tal�n a mongolok majd menethelyzet� m�lt mellett a k�vetkez� egys�g j�n, hogy ind�tson t�mad�st? Or did the new unit open up and let the previous force pass through it? Vagy hogy az �j egys�g megnyit�s�t, �s hagyja, hogy a kor�bbi hat�lyos �t rajta? It is clear that the succeeding unit could not launch its attack until the preceding one was well out of the way. K�ts�gtelen, hogy az egys�g nem siker�l elind�tani a t�mad�st, am�g a megel�z� egy j�l el az �tb�l. Finally, the idea that the Mongol troopers would then go to replace their mounts is hard to picture. V�g�l, az �tletet, hogy a mongol katona lenne majd, hogy a r�gz�t�st�l neh�z k�pet. In the tumult of the battle, they would have to search out their mounts (were they with grooms, other soldiers?), certainly a far from simple task given the general confusion that accompanies any battle. A z�rzavar a csat�ban, akkor a keres�s ki r�gz�t�st�l (ezek a grooms, a t�bbi katona?), Term�szetesen sokkal egyszer� feladat biztos�tani, hogy az �ltal�nos zavar k�s�ri minden csat�t.

As will be seen, there is some evidence that the Mongols did attack in waves, but it would seem this was not executed as easily as has been suggested. Mint l�tni fogjuk, van n�mi bizony�t�k arra, hogy a mongolok nem t�mad�si hull�mokban, de �gy t�nik, ez nem volt k�nny� v�grehajtani, mint ahogy azt javasolta. In addition, it appears that this was not the only tactic adopted by the Mongols. R�ad�sul �gy t�nik, hogy nem ez volt az egyetlen taktika elfogadta a mongolok. A fourteenth-century Mamluk military manual describes the Mongol attack thus: A tizennegyedik sz�zadban Mamluk katonai k�zik�nyv ismerteti a mongol t�mad�s �gy:

The Mongols [al-mughul] from among the Turks customarily form one squadron [kurdus], in order to push one another against the enemy [li-yatadafa'a 'ala al-'uduw], [in order] to prevent all of them from retreating and withdrawing. A mongolok [al-mughul] k�z�l a t�r�k�k szok�s egyik sz�zadhoz [kurdus] annak �rdek�ben, hogy �lljon egym�ssal szemben ellens�ges [Li-yatadafa'a 'ala al-'uduw], [a], hogy megakad�lyozza az �sszes �ket a visszavonul� �s visszavon�s�ra.

This passage is problematic. Ezt a probl�m�t. There is sufficient evidence that the Mongols actually did divide their armies into separate squadrons (atlab or karadis) in battle, as in the first and second battles of Homs as well as at Abulustayn (see below). Nincs elegend� bizony�t�k arra, hogy a mongolok t�nylegesen megosztotts�g a seregeiket k�l�n sz�zad (atlab vagy karadis) a harcban, mint az els� �s a m�sodik csat�t az Homs valamint Abulustayn (l�sd al�bb). But it is possible that on occasion at least, the Mongols adopted the tactic of a concerted, mass attack straight into the enemy formation (surely shooting as they went), eschewing the tactic of wave-after-wave of hit-and- run archery. De az is el�fordulhat, hogy alkalmank�nt legal�bb a mongolok elfogadta a taktika egy �sszehangolt, a t�meges t�mad�s egyenesen az ellens�g k�pz�dm�ny (biztosan forgat�s, mivel ment), a taktika eschewing hull�m ut�n hull�m a rajta�t�sszer� �j�szat .

It has been suggested that the Mongols let off only one volley as they approached the Mamluk enemy, perhaps as close as 30 meters. Javasolt�k, hogy a mongolok els�t egyetlen volley ahogy k�zeledett a Mamluk ellens�g, tal�n legk�zelebb 30 m�ter. Yet even the heavier type of Mongol arrow was effective to some degree at a longer distance, possibly to 150 yards. De m�g a nehezebb t�pus� Mongol ny�l hat�kony volt, hogy bizonyos m�rt�kben m�r a t�vols�g, esetleg a 150 yard. In addition, as both The Secret History and Marco Polo report, the Mongols had lighter arrows. R�ad�sul, mivel a titkos t�rt�nete �s a Marco Polo-jelent�s, a mongolok voltak k�nnyebbek nyilak. which could be used for shooting either longer distances or over the heads of forward ranks . amelyek felhaszn�lhat�k forgat�s ak�r hosszabb t�vokon vagy feje f�l�tt el�re soraiban. In the light of Plano Carpini's statement that when the Mongols attack, each one shoots "three or four arrows at their adversaries," it is possible to suggest that they let loose a volley or even volleys of these light arrows at a trajectory while still some distance away. Annak f�ny�ben, Plano Carpini azon kijelent�se, hogy ha a mongolok t�mad�s egyes hajt�sok "h�rom vagy n�gy ny�llal azok ellenfelek," lehets�ges, hogy azt sugallj�k, hogy kienged egy z�por, vagy ak�r volleys ezeknek f�ny nyilak a r�pp�lya, hogy m�g n�h�ny t�vols�gra. As they were shooting at a large body, these volleys would appear to have had some effect. Mivel ezek lõni egy nagyobb, ezek a volleys �gy t�nik, hogy volt n�mi hat�suk. They would certainly be disconcerting to those under attack, making it difficult for them to return fire. Azt biztosan lehangol�, hogy ezen a t�mad�st, ami megnehez�ti sz�mukra, hogy visszat�rjenek a t�zet. In any case, the Mongol attackers would still have time to prepare for another volley, using heavier arrows at close quarters. Mindenesetre a mongol t�mad�k m�g ideje felk�sz�lni a m�sik volley, nehezebb nyilak seg�ts�g�vel k�zvetlen k�zelr�l.

Archery was certainly critical for the Mongols but not sufficient for them to win. �j�szat volt kritikus a mongolok, de nem el�gs�ges ahhoz, hogy nyersz. As RC Smail wrote of the Turks (apparently referring to both Mamluks and Turkmen): "The mobility and archery of the Turks alone were usually insufficient to give them victory. By such means they weakened the enemy, but his final defeat on the battlefield could be achieved only by the fight at close quarter with lance, sword, and club." Mint RC �rta Smail a t�r�k�k (nyilv�nval�an utal a Mamluks �s a t�rkm�n): "A mobilit�s �s az �j�szat a t�r�k�k egyed�l �ltal�ban nem elegend�, hogy nekik gy�zelmet. Ilyen eszk�z�kkel meggyeng�lt az ellens�g, de a v�gs� veres�g is a csatat�ren lehet el�rni, csak a harc k�zel negyed�t a l�ndzsa, kard, �s a klub. " This applies mutatis mutandis to the Mongols. Ez �rtelemszer�en a mongolok. At some point, the Mongols would have had to throw themselves on the Mamluks armed with axes, maces and - as has been seen - swords. Valamikor, a mongolok volna dobja meg a Mamluks felfegyverkezve tengelyek, maces �s - amint azt l�tni - kard.

The Mamluks, of course, did more than wait on their horses for the Mongols to attack, responding only by shooting from their bows. A Mamluks, persze, nem t�bb, mint v�rni, hogy a lovak a mongolok a t�mad�s, reag�l�s csak l�v�ld�z�s val� �j. The intensive practice which the Mamluks underwent in the hippodrome in shooting while at full gallop indicates that they were trained to launch a frontal attack at the right time, letting off arrows (whether or not in concert is another question) at their enemy. Az intenz�v gyakorlat a Mamluks al� a l�versenyp�lya a forgat�s k�zben teljes v�gta azt jelzi, hogy k�pzett, hogy ind�tson egy front�lis t�mad�st a megfelel� id�ben, a b�rbead�s le nyilak (ak�r t�bb m�sik k�rd�s) az ellens�get. Then, relying on their heavier horses, armor and weapons, they would bear down on the enemy line, hoping to drive them back. Azt�n, a csup�n a saj�t nehezebb lovakat, p�nc�lt, fegyvereket, ezek nem viselik meg az ellens�ges vonal, abban a rem�nyben, hogy vezessen vissza.

Thus it was in theory. �gy elm�letben volt. What were the actual tactics and fighting methods used by the armies in the four pitched battles on an open field examined in this study: 'Ayn Jalut (658/1260), the first battle of Homs (659/1260), Abulustayn (675/1277) and the second battle of Homs (680/1281) [The battle at the Euphrates in 671/1272 is not included, because of its unusual nature (the Mongols taking a position behind a palisade; the Mamluks attacking after fording the river).] Unfortunately, as has been seen, the sources are usually less than explicit about the actual fighting methods employed in the battles. Mi volt a taktika, �s a t�nyleges harci m�dszerek a hadseregek a n�gy csat�kat hang� ny�lt ter�leten vizsg�lta ezt a tanulm�nyt: "Ayn Jalut (658/1260), az els� csata Homs (659/1260), Abulustayn (675 / 1277) �s a m�sodik csata Homs (680/1281) [A csat�ban az Eufr�tesz a 671/1272 nem tartalmazza, mert a szokatlan (a mongolok a helyzetben, hogy a pal�nk m�g�tt, a Mamluks t�mad�s ut�n �tkel� a foly�) .] Sajnos, amint azt m�r l�ttuk, a forr�sok �ltal�ban kevesebb inform�ci�t tartalmaz a t�nyleges harci m�dszerek a csat�t. We find such expressions describing Mamluk attacks: "[Qutuz] himself and those with him launched a brave assault (hamla sadiqa)"; "they launched against them a concerted attack (hamalu 'alayhim hamlat rajul wahid)"; "the [Mamluk] armies in their entirety attacked together ( ... fa-hamalat al- 'asakir bi-rummatiha hamlat rajul wahid) ." Tal�lunk ilyen kifejez�seket le�rja Mamluk t�mad�sok: "[Qutuz] mag�t �s a vele egy�tt indult egy b�tor t�mad�s (hamla sadiqa)"; "ind�tott ellen�k �sszehangolt t�mad�s (hamalu" alayhim hamlat rajul wahid) "a [Mamluk] hadseregek teljes eg�sz�ben t�madt�k egy�tt (... fa-hamalat al-"asakir bi-rummatiha hamlat rajul wahid)." For that matter, there is little mention of the use of bows and arrows by both sides, apparently because it was obvious to all authors that this was the way these armies fought. Ami azt illeti, kev�s eml�t�st haszn�lata �j �s nyilak mindk�t oldalon, nyilv�nval�an az�rt, mert nyilv�nval� volt, hogy mind a szerz�k, hogy ez az a m�d, ahogyan ezeket a hadseregek harcoltak.

Information of a more exact nature, however, does exist: at the second battle of Homs and possibly at 'Ayn Jalut, it is recorded that the Mamluks launched a series of attacks until the Mongols were defeated. Inform�ci�s egy pontos term�szete azonban nem l�tezik: a m�sodik csata Homs, �s esetleg a "Ayn Jalut, hogy regisztr�lj�k, hogy a Mamluks sorozatot ind�tott t�mad�st, am�g a mongolok voltak veres�get. It is also important to note that in three of the four battles the Mongols opened up the fighting by attacking first. Azt is fontos megjegyezni, hogy h�rom, a n�gy csat�kat a mongolok megnyitotta a harcok a t�mad� el�sz�r. The exception was the first battle of Homs, which in any case was actually won by a Syrian Ayyubid army, albeit probably composed to a large degree of Ayyubid mamluks. A kiv�tel volt az els� csata Homs, amely minden esetben t�nylegesen megnyerte a sz�riai hadsereg Ayyubid, de tal�n �ssze, hogy egy nagy m�rt�k� Ayyubid mamluks.

Taking the above into consideration along with Professor Smith's research, the following general remarks on Mamluk tactics against the Mongols can be made: the Mamluks absorbed the initial Mongol attack, probably maintaining a steady fire of arrows as they approached . A fent eml�tettek figyelembe egy�tt Smith professzor kutat�s, a k�vetkez� �ltal�nos megjegyz�seket Mamluk taktik�t mongolok ellen lehet tenni: a Mamluks felsz�v�dik az els� mongol t�mad�s, val�sz�n�leg fenntart�sa �lland� t�z ny�lz�por ahogy k�zeledett. If the Mamluks held their position and repulsed the Mongols, they would then go over to the offensive, launching a concerted, all-out attack, the front rank (at least) shooting as they rode until they reached the enemy lines, where they would then bring into play maces, axes, swords and perhaps lances. Ha a Mamluks tartott�k helyzet�ket �s repulsed a mongolokat, akkor menj �t a t�mad�, ind�t �sszehangolt, minden-ki t�mad�s, az els� helyez�s (legal�bb) a forgat�s lovagoltak, am�g el nem �rte el az ellens�ges vonalakon, ahol nem majd j�t�kba maces, tengelyek, kardok �s tal�n l�ndzsa. On occasion, it seems, the Mamluks employed repeated attacks, perhaps hit-and-run archery barrages (reminiscent of the Mongol tactics) in order to soften up the enemy. El�fordul, hogy �gy t�nik, a foglalkoztatottak Mamluks ism�telt t�mad�sok, tal�n cserbenhagy�sos �j�szat g�tak (eml�keztet a mongol taktika) annak �rdek�ben, hogy megpuhuljon az ellens�get.

As for the Mongols, we have two pieces of information that might confirm Professor Smith's suggestion for standard battle procedure: first, at the first battle of Homs, the Mongols were organized in eight squadrons (atlab), one after another, as if they were ready to launch a series of successive attacks . A mongolok, van k�t inform�ci�t, ami meger�s�ten� Smith professzor �ltal javasolt standard csata elj�r�s: el�sz�r, az els� csata Homs, a mongolok szerveztek nyolc sz�zad (atlab), az egyik a m�sik ut�n, mintha k�sz ind�t az egym�st t�mad�sokat. Second, during the second battle of Homs - according to Baybars al-Mansuri - when the Mongol Left attacked the Mamluk Right, "[The Mongols] were organized as squadrons (atlaban) in [the attack] and followed one another as groups (taradafu ahzaban)." M�sodszor, a m�sodik csata Homs - a Baybars al-Mansuri - amikor a mongol baloldal t�madta Mamluk jobb, "[a mongolok] szerveztek a sz�zad (atlaban) a [a t�mad�st] �s egy m�sik a csoportok (taradafu ahzaban). " Although this is not unequivocal (there is no mention of a rapid succession of squadrons letting off volleys of arrows and wheeling off to the rear), there is nothing that contradicts Professor Smith's thesis and this evidence could be seen to complement it. B�r ez nem egy�rtelm� (nem besz�lve egy gyors egym�sut�nban a sz�zadok hagyta ki volleys ny�lz�por �s kerekez�s ki a h�ts�), nincs semmi, hogy az ellentmond professzor Smith disszert�ci�, �s ez a bizony�t�k lehet l�tni, hogy kieg�sz�tse azt.

At the battle of Abulustayn, however, things were different. A csata Abulustayn azonban a dolgok m�s. There, the Mongols launched a frontal attack against the Mamluks, penetrating the enemy lines. Itt a mongolok front�lis t�mad�st ind�tott a Mamluks, bejut az ellens�ges vonalak. This may be an instance of the Mongol tactic of the concerted attack, described in the above-cited Mamluk military manual, although the Mongols were not organized here as one squadron, but at least initially were arranged as separate tactical units. Ez lehet p�ld�ul a mongol taktik�ja az �sszehangolt t�mad�s, le van �rva a fent id�zett Mamluk katonai k�zik�nyv, b�r a mongolok nem voltak szervezett itt egy sz�zadot, de legal�bbis kezdetben a rendszer k�l�n taktikai egys�gek. As for 'Ayn Jalut, we have no clear information beyond that the Mongols attacked first; for what it is worth, al-Maqrizi tells us that the two sides "slammed into each other (idtarabat)." Ami a "Ayn Jalut, nincs egy�rtelm� t�j�koztat�st azon t�l, hogy a mongolok megt�madt�k els�, mert mi az �rt�ke, az al-Maqrizi elmondja, hogy a k�t oldal" becsapta az egym�st (idtarabat). "

Taken altogether, I would offer the following model for Mongol behavior on the battlefield. Figyelembe teljesen, akkor felaj�nlja az al�bbi modell Mongol viselked�s�t a csatamez�n. The Mongols sought to attack first. A mongolok k�v�nta t�mad�s els�. As the forward squadrons drew close, they let off as many arrows as possible. Mivel az el�re sz�zad felh�vta k�zel�ben, akkor hagyd ki a sok nyilak, amennyire csak lehets�ges. The Mongols were prepared to launch successive waves of archers, but if they caught the Mamluks in a state of relative disorganization, as at Abulustayn, then they plunged straight into the Mamluk lines. A mongolok voltak k�sz�lve, hogy ind�tsanak egym�st k�vet� hull�mai �j�sz, de ha elkapta a Mamluks az �llam viszonylagos sz�tz�lleszt�s, mint Abulustayn, akkor mer�lt egyenesen a Mamluk sorokat.

At both Abulustayn and the second battle of Homs, the Mongols dismounted when the battle began to go against them. Mindk�t Abulustayn �s a m�sodik csata Homs, a mongolok lesz�llt, amikor a csat�ban kezdett el vel�k szemben. This tactic was not an innovation from the war with the Mamluks: the Mongols had dismounted in their battles with the Khwrazm-shah Jalal al-Din. Ez a taktika nem volt innov�ci�, a h�bor� a Mamluks: a mongolok m�r lesz�llt a csat�t a Khwrazm-sah Jalal al-Din. The Mongols may have dismounted because their horses were exhausted, although it is more likely that this was a more effective defensive maneuver: the Mongol troops could let off more accurately aimed arrows when standing than on horseback. A mongolok is lesz�llt, mert a lovak kimer�ltek, de nagyobb a val�sz�n�s�ge, hogy ez egy hat�kony v�dekez� man�ver: a mongol csapatok is elenged pontosabban c�lozza nyilak, amikor �llva, mint l�h�ton. In the case of Abulustayn at least, the Mongols realized that the battle was lost, and in effect declared their willingness to fight to the end by dismounting. Abban az esetben, Abulustayn legal�bb a mongolok felismert�k, hogy a csata elveszett, �s a hat�s kinyilv�n�totta hajland�s�g�t, hogy a harc v�g�n dismounting. [At the battle of Wadi al-Khaznadar (699/1299), the Mongol army was caught unprepared by the Mamluk attack, and a part received the Mamluk assault dismounted, taking cover behind their horses.] There are no examples of the Mamluks dismounting during battle. [A csat�ban a Wadi Al-Khaznadar (699/1299), a mongol hadsereg felk�sz�letlen�l fogott a Mamluk t�mad�st, �s egy r�sz�t kapta meg a Mamluk t�mad�s lesz�llt, �s kiterjed a l� m�g�tt.] Nincs p�lda a Mamluks dismounting a csat�t. At their one defeat at Wadi al-Khaznadar in 699/1299, the Mamluks, rather than fight to the death, for all their "professionalism" fled the battlefield in complete disarray. Az, hogy egy veres�g a Wadi Al-Khaznadar a 699/1299, a Mamluks, ahelyett, hogy harcolni kell a hal�l, az �sszes "szakmais�g" elmenek�lt a csatat�ren teljesen �sszezavar.

In the above discussion it has been suggested that in the long run, the Ilkhanid army may have been influenced by its control of a large, rich and settled country such as Iran, primarily in the size of the horses and the quality and type of weapons (and perhaps armor). A fenti vita azt javasolta, hogy hossz� t�von a hadsereg Ilkhanid is befoly�solta, hogy ellen�rz�st gyakorol a nagy, gazdag �s �lland� orsz�gban, mint p�ld�ul Ir�n, els�sorban a m�rete a l� �s a min�s�g �s a t�pus� fegyverek (�s tal�n a p�nc�l). It is difficult, however, to determine the rate and extent of this change, and how much of it occurred as a result of deliberate policy on the part of the Ilkhans and the senior officers. Neh�z azonban meghat�rozni a sebess�ge �s m�rt�ke ez a v�ltoz�s, �s mennyi is el�fordult k�vetkezt�ben tudatos politika r�sze az Ilkhans, �s a magas rang� tisztvisel�ket. In a recent article, Professor AP Martinez has suggested a thought-provoking thesis that, in fact, the Ilkhans themselves initiated a transition from light cavalry to heavy cavalry, and that this transformation began quite early on and reached its height in the reign of Ghazan. Egy nemr�giben cikket professzor AP Martinez azt javasolta a gondolat�breszt� t�zis, hogy val�j�ban a Ilkhans maguk kezdem�nyezte �tmenet k�nny� lovass�g neh�z lovass�g, �s hogy ez az �talakul�s meglehet�sen kor�n kezdett, �s eljutott a magass�ga uralkod�sa Ghazan . This innovation in the military sphere was connected to the terrain over which the Mongols now had to fight and the nature of their main enemies, the Mamluks, as well as to the changes in the Mongol society of the Ilkhanid state. Ez az �j�t�s a katonai ter�let volt csatlakoztatva a terep felett, amely a mongolok volt felvenni a harcot, �s a term�szet a f� ellens�gei, a Mamluks, valamint a v�ltoz�sokat a mongol t�rsadalom a Ilkhanid �llamban. These are major subjects which transcend the limitations of the present study. Ezek f� t�m�i a korl�toz�sokat, amelyek t�lmutatnak a jelen tanulm�ny. In the following discussion, therefore, I will concentrate on examining the evidence of a possible transition having occurred from light to heavier cavalry in the Ilkhanid army within the period covered by this work (1260-81). A k�vetkez� megbesz�l�s, ez�rt fogok koncentr�lni vizsg�lja a bizony�t�kokat egy esetleges �tmeneti bek�vetkezett k�nny� a nehezebb lovass�g a Ilkhanid hadsereg bel�l al� ezt a munk�t (1260-81).

I must say from the outset that within this narrow framework I am not in full agreement with Professor Martinez's conclusions. Azt kell mondanom, a kezdetekt�l fogva, hogy e sz�k keretek nem vagyok teljes m�rt�kben egyet�rt professzor Martinez k�vetkeztet�seit. One shortcoming of his study is the lack of a discussion of the battle of 'Ayn Jalut. Az egyik hi�nyoss�g a dolgoz�szob�j�ban van, hogy nincs vita a csata "Ayn Jalut. Taking this battle into consideration, we can see that the following statement cannot be made: Ezen csat�ban figyelembe, l�thatjuk, hogy a k�vetkez� kijelent�st nem lehet tenni:

The battle of Elbistan [ie, Abulustayn in 675/1277 - RA] is significant because it marks a further stage in the development of tactical weight by the Il-Xanid army. A csata Elbistan [azaz Abulustayn a 675/1277 - RA] is jelent�s, mert �j, a fejleszt�si szakaszban a taktikai t�meg az Il-Xanid hadsereg. During it, for the first time, Il-Xanid Mongol forces charged the Mamluk calvary [sic] and dismounted to receive their attack and to subject the onrushing enemy cavalry to an intensive barrage of projectile fire. Alatt, mert az els� alkalom, hogy Il-Xanid mongol er�ket terheli a Mamluk Calvary [sic] �s lesz�llt, hogy a t�mad�st, �s figyelemmel a onrushing ellens�ges lovass�g az intenz�v duzzaszt�g�tj�ig l�ved�ket t�zet. However, that the Mongols had not yet achieved sufficient weight is evident from the thoroughness of their defeat... Azonban, hogy a mongolok m�g nem elegend� s�lyt el�rni az nyilv�nval� az alaposs�g a veres�g ...

It has been clearly shown that the Mongols attacked first at 'Ayn Jalut, so this cannot be taken as an indication of any development within the Ilkhanid army. Ez egy�rtelm�en mutatja, hogy a mongolok megt�madt�k el�sz�r "Ayn Jalut, �gy ezt nem lehet tenni, mint annak a jel�t semmilyen fejl�d�s a Ilkhanid hadsereg. If anything, there are clear indications that this was standard Mongol practice. Ha b�rmi van egy�rtelm�, hogy ez a szabv�ny Mongol gyakorlatban. In addition, it has also been seen above that dismounting was a tactic used by the Mongols as early as their conflict with the Khwarazam-shah Jalal al-Din, so this too cannot be taken as evidence for a change of tactics and equipment. Ezenk�v�l azt is l�tta, hogy a fenti dismounting volt a taktika, amelyet az mongolok m�r azok ellent�tesek a Khwarazam-sah Jalal al-Din, ez t�l nem lehet bizony�t�k, hogy m�dos�tani a taktik�k �s berendez�sek. Finally, the "thoroughness of their defeat" was probably due to the fact that the relatively small Mongol force was facing almost the entire Mamluk army. V�g�l, a "alaposs�g�nak a veres�g" volt az oka, hogy a viszonylag kis l�tsz�m� mongol hat�lyos n�z� szinte az eg�sz Mamluk hadsereg. Several reservations were raised in chapter 8 regarding Professor Martinez's reconstruction and analysis of the second battle of Homs. Sz�mos fenntart�s mer�lt fel a 8. fejezetet a professzor Martinez rekonstrukci�s �s elemz�se, a m�sodik csata Homs. There too, it was shown that there is little basis for the claim that the Ilkhanid army was in the midst of a deliberate reorganization on a massive scale. Ott is azt mutatja, hogy kev�s a alapj�n az az �ll�t�s, hogy a hadsereg Ilkhanid a k�zep�n sz�nd�kos �tszervez�s a t�meges m�retekben.

Professor Martinez discusses one other battle which falls within the timespan of my study, although it is outside its purview: the battle of Herat between Abagha and Baraq in 668/1270 (not 1269 as Martinez writes). Professzor Martinez t�rgyalja egy csat�ban esik az id� alatt a dolgoz�szob�mban, b�r k�v�l terjedelem: a csata Herat k�z�tti Abagha �s Baraq a 668/1270 (nem 1269, mint �rja, Martinez). I will limit myself to several brief comments on his discussion. �n magam is a hat�r�rt�k t�bb r�vid megjegyz�sek a vit�t. First, Martinez mainly bases his reconstruction on Sayf-i Harawi's Ta'rikh-nama-i harat and to a lesser extent on Wassaf's history. El�sz�r is, Martinez alapjait f�k�nt a rekonstrukci� a Sayf-i Harawi's Ta'rikh-nama-i harat �s kisebb m�rt�kben a Wassaf t�rt�net�ben. A look at Rashid al-Din as well as the Mamluk sources might lead to a different reconstruction." Second, the battle was fought well to the south of Herat, on an open plain, and not "outside the town of Herat," with the associated implications which Martinez makes. Thirdly, although the Mongol elite guard, the bahadurs, may well have carried spears or lances of some type, as Wassaf suggests, there is no indication that this is something new. It is possible that the Mongol imperial guard - either of the Qa'an or the various khans - had long carried lances; [Plano Carpini, writing in the 1240s, reports that some of the Mongol troops had "lances which have a hook in the iron neck, and with this, if they can, they wll drag a man from his saddle."] it certainly seems that these troops had more sophisticated arms or armor than the average Mongol. The presence of such troops at the battle of Herat cannot be seen as a tactical shift of the whole Mongol army. Fourthly, here - as at the second battle of Homs - Martinez may be overestimating the importance of the Georgian contingent at Herat. We have no idea what was the size of this unit, and what exact role it played. [The evidence of the Georgian Chronicle edited by Brosset cannot be taken too seriously, as this source tends to exaggerate the importance of the Georgian contribution to the Mongol war effort.] In this connection, it is worth citing the words of Dr. Bedrosian: Egy pillant�s Rashid al-Din, valamint a forr�sok Mamluk vezethet a k�l�nb�z� �jj��p�t�si. "M�sr�szt a csata volt, j�l k�zd�tt, hogy a d�l-Herat, ny�lt sima, �s nem" k�ls� v�ros Herat, "a A kapcsol�d� k�vetkezm�nyeket Martinez teszi. Harmadszor, b�r a mongol elit �r, a bahadurs is j�l v�gzett Spears vagy l�ndzsa n�h�ny t�pusra, mivel Wassaf sugallja, nincs jele annak, hogy ez valami �j. Elk�pzelhet�, hogy a mongol birodalmi �r - vagy a Qa'an vagy a k�l�nb�z� khans - r�g�ta folytatott l�ndzsa [Plano Carpini, �r�sban, a 1240s, jelent�sek, hogy a mongol csapatok, hogy "l�ndzsa amelyek egy kamp� a vas-nyak, �s ez, ha lehet, akkor wll h�zza az ember a saj�t h�tas. "] �gy t�nik, hogy ezek a csapatok m�r sokkal kifinomultabb fegyver vagy p�nc�l, mint az �tlagos mongol. Az ilyen csapatok a csata Herat nem l�tott taktikai tol�d�s�val az eg�sz mongol sereget. Negyedszer, itt - mint a m�sodik csata Homs - Martinez is t�lbecs�lik annak fontoss�g�t, hogy a gr�z kontingenst a Herat. Fogalmunk sincs, mi volt, mint ez az egys�g, �s mi a pontos szerepet j�tszott. [ A bizony�t�k a gr�z Kr�nika szerkesztette Brosset nem lehet t�l komolyan venni, mivel ez a forr�s hajlamos t�lzol annak fontoss�g�t, hogy a gr�z hozz�j�rul�s�t a mongol h�bor�s er�fesz�t�sekhez.] E tekintetben �rdemes a sz�t Dr. Bedrosian:

Because the Mongols considered their subject people expendable, they usually designated them as advance attackers. Mivel a mongolok tekinteni, hogy az emberek figyelemmel fel�ldozhat�, �ltal�ban kijel�lt �ket el�re a t�mad�kat. This was not, as the History of K'art'li and Grigor Aknerc'i would have us believe, because the Armeno- Georgian troops were such excellent warriors, but first precisely because the Caucasians were expendable and second, because desertion was impossible with foreign troops fighting in front or in detachments surrounded by Mongols. Ez nem volt, mivel a t�rt�net K'art'li �s Grigor Aknerc'i azt gondolja, mert a Armeno-gr�z csapatok ilyen kiv�l� harcosok, de az els�, pontosan az�rt, mert a kauk�zusiak is fel�ldozhat�, m�sr�szt az�rt, mert lehetetlen volt a sz�k�s k�lf�ldi csapatok elleni harc el�tt vagy detachments k�r�lvett mongolok.